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THE REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN
COMMISSION ON LEGAL EDUCATION: A
ROAD MAP TO NEEDED REFORM, OR
JUST ANOTHER REPORT?
WILLIAM

D. UNDERWOOD*

I. INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR REFORM OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Calls for reform of legal education, like these in the Wisconsin
Commission on Legal Education Report,' are nothing new. Throughout
this century, lawyers and law students alike have challenged law schools
to do more than simply prepare students to "think like lawyers."
Indeed, as early as 1890, the Standing Committee on Legal Education of
the American Bar Association cautioned that:
[t]he rapid growth and success of law schools must not make us
forget that there were also peculiar advantages in the older
method of office instruction which should not be lost sight of if
we can help it, and that these schools, like all human institutions,
are susceptible of almost indefinite improvement.2
Nearly twenty-five years later, in 1913, the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching issued a report highly critical of the increasingly academic focus of legal education. In summarizing, E. Gordon
Gee and Donald W. Jackson stated that the report suggested four ways
to produce law graduates who had appropriate exposure to legal doctrine
and practical skills:
(1) [f]aculty contact with legal practice, (2) law school courses in

* Professor of Law and Senior Counsel, Baylor University. J.D., summa cum laude,
University College of Law. B.A., magna cum laude, Oklahoma Baptist University. Portions
of this essay are derived from the author's previous essay on legal education entitled, The
Decline of Professional Legal Training and a Proposalfor Its Revitalization in Professional
Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 202 (1996).
1. Commission on Legal Education, FinalReport & Recommendations, 1996 STATE BAR
OF WISCONSIN [hereinafter Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report].
2. E. Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson, Bridgingthe Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer
Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 786-87 (quoting Standing Committee on Legal
Education Report, 13 A.B.A. REP. 327, 329 (1890)).
3. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW, (Carnegie
found. Bull. No. 15 (1921)); see also ALFRED Z. REED, PRESENT DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE

UNITED STATES AND CANADA (Carnegie found, for the Advancement of Teaching the Law
Bull. No. 21, (1928) (discussing the function of law schools in the United States and Canada).
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practical application of the law, (3) imitation of practical activities
within the law school, including moot courts, drafting of written
instruments, and problem-method training in the use of judicial
decisions, and (4) greater emphasis upon the concrete law of a
particular jurisdiction, as distinguished from the generalized law
taught by the leading law schools.4

Over the decades that followed, others continued to urge for a more
balanced and practical approach to legal education. Among the many
critics of legal education was Jerome Frank who argued that it was
possible to provide practical training without endangering the academic
process. Frank believed that "without giving up entirely the case-book
system or the growing and valuable alliance with the so-called social
sciences, the law schools should once more get in intimate contact with
what clients need and what courts and lawyers actually do."5 Frank
demanded "lawyer schools" and argued that:
The law student should learn, while in school, the art of legal
practice. And to that end, the law school should boldly, not slyly
and evasively, repudiate the false dogmas of Langdell. They must
decide not to exclude, as did Langdell-but to include-the
methods of learning law by work in the lawyer's office and
attendance at the proceedings of the courts of justice ....They
must repudiate the absurd notion that the heart of a law school
is its library.6
Consistent with these conclusions, in 1979 the Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law
Schools (the Cramton Report) challenged law schools to assume greater
responsibility for preparing students to actually practice law, rather than
simply preparing students to learn to practice law.
These calls for reform of legal education have gone largely unheeded.
Rather than reforming the core of the traditional law school program to
provide more practical training, legal educators have tended to create
clinics, have hired clinicians to process cases through the clinics, and have
admitted a handful of students to the clinical programs. Comforted by

4. Gee & Jackson, supra note 1, at 757.
5. Jerome Frank, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907,913 (1933).
6.

ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION INAMERICA FROM THE 1850s

TO THE 1980s 156-57 (quoting Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?,
Speech Before the Section of Legal Education (1933), in LEE, THE STUDY OF LAW AND
PROPER PREPARATION 29 (1933)).
7. Report and Recommendation of the Task Force On Lawyer Competency: The Role
of Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 103 [hereinafter
Cramton Report].
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the belief that clinics would silence the calls for reform, the mainstream
curriculum at many law schools has actually drifted even further away
from the objective of training students for careers as legal practitioners.
Though the reasons for this drift are many, the identity of persons hired
to teach in law schools is at its core. The simple fact today is that many
law faculty members have little experience practicing law, have little
interest in practicing law, and have little aptitude for practicing law. As
a result, law faculty members who do not comprehend, appreciate, or
care about the problems of practicing lawyers are not likely to address
those problems in their classrooms or in their scholarship. One
commentator has thus observed that:
The elite journals (and, perhaps even more so, those that aspire
to be elite) publish far more pages than formerly that are directed
only at other academics and not at members of the bar. Few of
the articles in most of the elite journals would be of interest
to-some not even comprehensible by-a practicing lawyer.'
These theoretical scholars inevitably tend to teach law students the
impractical subject of their scholarship. They find their scholarship
interesting and naturally view it as important. As one commentator has
observed, "despite the frequent discomfort of the fit, it is difficult to
resist the temptation to translocate one's research interests into the
classroom."9 Therefore, a course on contracts becomes a course on
microeconomics, with little attention being paid to contracts doctrine. In
the same vein, teaching an advanced course in corporate law is less
attractive to the theoretical scholar than teaching an advanced course on
sociology and law, with a significant emphasis on sociology. Accordingly,
one faculty member of an elite law school recently observed that:
[c]ompared to the curriculum of a faculty made up exclusively of
lawyers, our curriculum is less rich in practical or substantive law
courses and more rich in courses drawing principally on the Arts
and Sciences. In part because more and more of our teachers
have graduate degrees from, or attachment to, a particular area
of the Arts and Sciences, other curricular changes are now being
proposed that may also lead further from and not closer to the
bar and practical legal practice.'0
The bottom line is that the law taught in today's law schools bears
only a slight resemblance to the law practiced by graduates of those
8. James J. White, Letter to Judge Henry Edwards,91 MICH. L. REv. 2177,2184 (1993).
9. Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools Without Lawyers? Winds of Changein LegalEducation,
81 VA. L. REv.1421, 1439 (1995).
10. White, supra note 8, at 2182-83.
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schools. Despite a century of calls for reform, the training currently
received in law schools generally does not adequately prepare law school
graduates to practice law. Instead, as one recent graduate observed,
"[liaw school is about training scholars."" The result is that criticism
of legal education has intensified in recent years. As a past president of
the ABA recently reported, "I can't find many people who are that
happy with legal education."' 2
This unhappiness with legal education led to publication in 1992 of
the MacCrate Report.13 While recognizing the obligation of the
profession in training new members, the MacCrate Report has also
charged law schools to make "education in lawyering skills and
professional values central" to their mission.'" The MacCrate Report
has thus provoked an unprecedented debate among legal educators
regarding what should, and indeed, can be done by law schools to
produce students who are competent to represent their first clients upon
graduation. 5 Practicing lawyers have joined the debate, primarily by
endorsing the view that law schools should do more than they traditionally have, and can do more than they think they can. The MacCrate
Report challenged the nation's state bar associations to review legal
education in their own jurisdictions'. The Wisconsin Commission on
Legal Education Report is the response of State Bar of Wisconsin to this
challenge.
II.

RECOGNIZING THE OBLIGATION OF LAW SCHOOLS TO PRODUCE
GRADUATES EQUIPPED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS
REQUIRED TO PRACTICE LAW COMPETENTLY UPON GRADUATION

The foundation of the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education
Report is the Commission's conclusion that "[o]ur law schools are
expected to graduate lawyers who can do what lawyers do."' 6 To one
not familiar with the modem culture of legal education, this conclusion
11. Scott Turow, Law School v. Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, (magazine) at 54.
12. Talbot D'Alemberte, Law School in the Nineties, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 52.
13. Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap,
1992 A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS [hereinafter MacCrate Report].
14. Id. at 330.
15. See, e.g., THE MACCRATE REPORT, BUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM,
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg eds., 1994); John J.

Costonis, The MacCrate Report: Of Loaves, Fishes,and the Future of American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993); Robert MacCrate, PreparingLawyers to ParticipateEffectively in the Legal Profession, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 89 (1994); Jack Stack, Dean Costonis on the
MacCrate Report, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 126 (1994).

16. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 25.
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would hardly seem controversial. In fact, however, this conclusion is
quite disturbing to many legal educators, who believe the goal of
graduating competent lawyers is unattainable. These educators have
adopted the far more modest goal of equipping students with the
background needed to "learn to be competent lawyers" after graduation. 7 Other legal educators have rejected the goal of training students
to practice law as being inconsistent with the mission of a universityaffiliated law school. Consequently, an increasingly prevalent view
among academics is instead that the "basic missions of the law school are
to produce knowledge for its own sake, and/or knowledge which is useful
to society ....",,"
One leading academic has actually declared that
"[law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and
to teach their students what they happen to discover."' 9
This philosophical mission would be entirely appropriate in one of
two contexts. One would be a law school where the students are not
preparing for entry into law practice, but are studying law in preparation
for pursuing some other career path. At this type of law school,
preparing students to actually practice law would be inappropriate. Of
course, admitting graduates of these schools to the practice of law would
also be inappropriate. The philosophical mission might also be
appropriate, or at least would do little harm, if graduates of the law
school were to receive a closely supervised and practical post-graduate
legal education. Unfortunately, this type of post-graduate education is
not readily available to today's law graduates. Many law students today
have principal responsibility for representing clients almost immediately
upon graduation. Approximately half of all lawyers in private practice
today are solo practitioners.2" Nearly thirty percent of graduating law
students in 1990 joined very small law firms or entered solo practices. 2'
And the most recent trend is toward a higher percentage of law school
graduates joining small law firms or opening their own practices.'
Small-firm lawyers typically bear sole responsibility for providing services

17. See generally Stark, supra note 14, at 157.
18. Linz Audain, CriticalLegal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics, and the Veil of
Intellectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-JurisprudentialDialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1017, 1071 (1992).
19. Peter W. Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom,
35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 26 (1985) (Letter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington).
20. See MacCrate Report, supra note 13, at 36.
21. See id. at 37 n.24.
22. See id. at 39.
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directly to individual clients.' Students who will bear such responsibility upon graduation cannot afford to spend law school learning only to
be a statesperson, a philosopher, or a law professor.
A graduate school model of legal education fails to meet the needs
of these students and it also fails to recognize the responsibility law
schools owe to future clients of their graduates. As the Cramton Report
concluded in 1979:
Greater concern for consumers-both the consumers of legal
services and the consumers of legal education-also points toward
greater law school responsibility for lawyer training. The notion
that young lawyers should gain an acceptable level of competence
in the practice, in effect learning at the expense of their first
clients, is today not an acceptable one. And many believe that
reliance on a period of informal apprenticeship to experienced
seniors in a firm to bridge the gap between law school instruction
and the demands of practice is no longer practicable for a large
number of law school graduates, if it ever was. In all likelihood,
the majority of law graduates never received first-rate on the job
training. Many have always begun professional work in settings
lacking both the resources and expertise necessary for effective
supervision.24
For many law graduates, learning to practice law while in school is
essential to ensure that their first clients receive competent representation.
Even those fortunate students who begin their legal careers in
carefully supervised environments need a practical legal education while
in law school. Like their less fortunate classmates, these graduates will
also perform lawyering tasks for clients. Close supervision by experienced lawyers will provide a safety net for clients. However, supervision
will only provide a quality legal education to the new lawyer if the
supervisor is interested in educating that lawyer. Such an interest is
increasingly uncommon.
The MacCrate Report noted that "the
availability of this education is uneven and unpredictable, that the
education often fails to provide adequate feedback and evaluation, and'
that the amount of this education is often inadequate to meet the
professional needs of many new attorneys. '' 5
Demands for increased productivity and expectations created by high
starting salaries are, at least in part, responsible for the loss of mentoring
23. See id. at 40.
24. Cramton Report, supra note 7, at 14-15.
25. MacCrate Report, supra note 13, at 300-01.
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in practice. One observer recently provided the following assessment of
on the job training programs:
The larger firms attempt to train those entering the profession
with in-house programs. I say "attempt to" because, despite a
strong effort by many law firms over the last ten years, a very
high percentage are incapable of providing a structured training
model for their associates ....The demand for billable hours
or wrongly take precedence in an era of high associate
can rightly
26
salary.
Given the absence of supervision of many new lawyers and the absence
of adequate in-house training for others, providing legal education
designed to ensure that law school graduates are competent to practice
law is imperative.
Law schools can produce graduates competent to begin practicing law
provided that competence is not confused with experience. No law
school can produce graduates experienced in performing all the various
tasks they will be called upon to perform in practice. Three years of
education is insufficient to provide this level of specificity in training.
Indeed, thirty years of education would be insufficient to give students
experience performing every task they will be required to perform over
their legal careers. But a lawyer need not have experience performing
a particular task to competently do so. As the Model-Rules of Professional Conduct recognize, "[a] lawyer need not necessarily have special
training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with
which the lawyer is unfamiliar."27 Experience in competently performing one lawyering task enables the lawyer to competently perform other
similar tasks.
Law schools should realistically aspire to produce students who know
basic legal doctrine, possess certain core lawyering skills, and have
experience using this knowledge and skill to competently perform a
reasonable range of lawyering tasks. Training competent lawyers must
begin with teaching basic legal doctrine. Legal doctrine provides the
26. Fulton Haight, Law Schools Are Still TrainingPeople to Be Associates in Major Law
Firms,B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1990, at 24,25. See also Stephanie B. Goldberg, Bridging the Gap:
Can Educatorsand PractitionersAgree on the Role of Law Schools in Shaping Professionals?
Yes and No, 76 A.B.A. J. 44,44-46. "When I graduated from law school 29 years ago, people
learned to practice law at the feet of a master. Lawyers would take you under their wing,
either within your firm or, in my case, at a government agency and later in a law firm. Even
if you went into solo practice, there was someone in town to mentor you and teach you the
the
practice of law .... Somewhere along the line in the last 30 years, however ....
mentoring system broke down." Id. at 44-45 (statement of David Link).
27.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 cmt. 2 (1996).
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context for learning core skills, followed by engaging in lawyering tasks,
which provides the context for the practice of law. Learning legal
doctrine does not simply mean memorizing black letter rules. Rather,
a student must develop a sophisticated grasp of the theory behind the
rules. Abstract legal rules cannot be applied to resolve concrete factual
problems without understanding the theoretical foundation of the rules.
For example, contract law requires certain agreements to be in writing
to be enforceable. Determining whether an agreement containing both
written and oral terms is enforceable under this rule requires an
understanding of the reason for the rule. Once the lawyer understands
this reason, the lawyer is then able to determine if the reason requires
invalidating the particular agreement. The ability to engage in this
mental process requires knowing not just the rule, but the policies behind
the rule. Knowing the policies behind the rule also allow students and
lawyers to intelligently question the validity of the rule.
In addition to knowing the rules in this broad sense, a lawyer must
also possess the skills needed to use this knowledge to resolve client
problems. Lawyers essentially do three things in representing clients:
they think, they speak, and they write. Thinking like a lawyer requires
accurate application of rules to resolve problems. This is generally
referred to as problem solving, or legal analysis and reasoning. Thinking
clearly and analytically is part of being a competent lawyer. A
competent lawyer must also communicate these thoughts clearly and
persuasively. Furthermore, clear speaking and writing, like clear
thinking, are core lawyering skills. Knowing the rules and possessing
these core skills are prerequisites to providing competent legal services.
The final stage in the process of providing competent legal services
is to use this knowledge and skill to execute lawyering tasks on the
client's behalf. A competent litigator must know the rules and think
analytically to develop a theory of the case. To produce results for the
client, however, the litigator must then implement this theory by
skillfully executing lawyering tasks, such as drafting pleadings, conducting
pretrial investigation, engaging in motion practice, selecting a jury, and
examining witnesses. Traditionally, law schools have largely ignored
teaching these lawyering tasks, instead focusing on what law schools
believed they did best-teaching analytical skills, substantive law, and
perhaps legal research. Generations of law students have thus graduated
with no more training in performing lawyering tasks than that provided
in law school moot court programs-largely unsupervised research and
drafting of a brief, coupled with oral argument. The challenge for law
schools is to develop a program that exposes students to legal doctrine,
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teaches the core lawyering skills of legal analysis and effective communication, and then gives students adequately supervised experience in
performing a reasonable range of lawyering tasks.
The Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education should be applauded
for encouraging Wisconsin's law schools to accept this challenge. The
Commission rightly rejects the view that producing graduates competent
to practice law is an unattainable or undesirable goal. Instead, the
Commission recognizes that "the consumers of legal services have the
right to expect that lawyers, including recent law graduates, are
competent to practice law. The law schools, the bar, and the courts have
a shared responsibility and an obligation to meet that expectation."28
III. WHY THE COMMISSION'S REPORT MAY NOT BRING ABOUT
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN WISCONSIN LEGAL EDUCATION

By recognizing that law schools are expected to graduate lawyers who
practice law, the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report has
pointed legal educators in the right direction. The Commission has not,
however, developed or recommended a program to achieve this
expectation, instead choosing to defer to legal educators to develop
needed reforms. Perhaps of even greater concern, the Report acknowledges as legitimate many of the traditional excuses articulated by legal
educators for why law schools cannot do what needs to be done. None
of these excuses is valid, and each could have been rejected. By failing
to do so, the Commission may have assured that no significant reform
will result from its efforts.
Lack of Resources as Justificationfor Maintainingthe Status Quo
Effective skills training tends to be more expensive than other aspects
of legal education because of the lower faculty-student ratios generally
required to provide necessary supervision and feedback.29 This cost is
a principal reason why many legal educators have concluded that
providing necessary skills training to all students is implausible. One law
school Dean recently concluded that "there is simply no way the school
can afford to distribute full-time faculty or four times their number in
adjuncts over the significant number of multiple-section skills/values
courses that presumably would be needed to staff such a 'coherent
A.

28. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 2.
29. See Stark, supra note 15, at 184-87.
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30

The Wisconsin Commission on Legal EducationReport provides little

response to this excuse, aside from observing that "law schools face
daunting fiscal constraints. '31 Certainly the expense of operating clinics
makes it implausible to rely on live-client clinics to ensure that all
students have access to adequate skills training. Presently, only thirty
percent of all graduating law students have access to clinics during their
law school careers. 32 Making clinics accessible to all students would
require dramatically increasing funds available for skills training. The
MacCrate Report estimates that the cost of providing full student access
to at least one live-client clinical experience during law school would
approximate an additional $6,000 per student.33 The cost of legal
education is already high enough that many students graduate with debts
which preclude entry into relatively low-paying careers in public service.
The tuition increases required to fund full access to live-client clinics
would make legal education inaccessible to some prospective students,
and would further erode access to public service careers for those
students who do manage to finance the tuition. Given this reality, the
MacCrateReport correctly concludes that "[a] goal of offering enrollment
in a live client in-house clinic to every student before he or she graduates
may not be feasible from a budgetary prospective for some time. '
The high cost of clinics cannot, however, justify failing to prepare
students to practice law competently upon graduation. There are other
ways to provide skills training in a cost-efficient way. Skills training by
simulation, for example, tends to be more cost efficient than training by
live-client clinic. Clinics require a much lower faculty-student ratio than
most simulations. The MacCrate Report estimates that clinics have an
average student-faculty ratio of 8:1, while the ratio in simulations ranges
from 14:1 to 18:1. 3'
Moreover, while clinics offer the advantages
associated with the presence of real clients, well-conceived simulations
offer a number of advantages that may collectively make these simulations a superior device for providing skills training. Initially, because
there are no real clients with real facts and real needs, the instructor in
a simulation has more control over the student's learning experience

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 185.
Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 31.
MacCrate Report, supra note 13, at 252.
See id. at 254, n.36.
Id. at n.36.
See id. at 250-51.
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than the clinic supervisor. One criticism of clinics is that the skills
training tends to be narrow and overly repetitive. The greater control
found in simulations enables the instructor to select the lawyering tasks
performed by the students. The instructor can thus ensure that students
engage in an appropriate variety of experiences. This control also allows
the instructor to determine the complexity of the tasks, and thus permits
structured progression from relatively simple to more complex tasks.
Simulations offer an additional pedagogical advantage over clinics.
Unlike clinics, simulations permit the integration of skills training into
the substantive curriculum. Students can learn to draft wills in the
context of a substantive class on estate planning, document a sale of
assets in the context of a class on business planning, or prepare a motion
to strike jury demand in the context of a class on procedure. The
integration of substantive courses and skills training enhances the
student's understanding of the substantive law by making that law less
abstract. The student not only learns the rules, but experiences how they
work. Learning the substantive law enhances skills training by demonstrating the relevance of substantive law in providing quality legal
services. These educational advantages are not available in clinics, which
tend to stand apart from the law school's substantive curriculum.
Task-oriented skills training can be made available in a wide range
of substantive courses. Achieving this ideal concededly requires
maintaining lower enrollments than would be tolerable in purely lecture
courses. One way to accomplish these lower enrollments without
significant increases in tuition is to divert resources from substantive
courses taught in lecture formats by creating genuinely large sections in
the lecture courses. This would free faculty resources to teach small
sections in substantive/skills courses. Moreover, achieving the ideal of
providing task-oriented skills training in the context of substantive
courses requires law schools to reconsider the criteria applied in hiring
faculty members. Faculty members without significant experience
practicing law are ill-equipped to teach practice skills. For this reason,
law schools must modify the criteria used to evaluate faculty candidates.
Rather than viewing significant practice experience and achievement as
a bar to faculty appointment, such experience and achievement should
ordinarily be viewed as a prerequisite. Moreover, many existing faculty
members may require periodic retraining in practice skills. This could
be accomplished through "practice" (as opposed to research) sabbaticals,
pro bono work, and even perhaps through practice-oriented research.
The MacCrate Report recommends in this regard that:
Enhancing the ability of both practitioners and law faculty to
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be effective teachers can be accomplished by having practitioners
teach in law schools and faculty engage in practice. A few
schools and employers have experimented with leaves of absence,
allowing practitioners to teach or faculty to practice. This can
help expose students, in the classroom, to the practical perspective of experienced practitioners and enable faculty to benefit
from a period of practice.
After such an experience, it is hoped that a returning faculty
member brings to the law school and presents to students an
expanded view of practice while the returning practitioner might
encourage colleagues to take a broader view of the firm's
responsibilities in training student clerks and young lawyers.36
Finally, providing necessary skills training will require law schools to
make a number of hard choices. To be cost-effective, an adequate skills
training program will need to displace some of what presently occurs at
law schools. Interdisciplinary and jurisprudential courses can be
valuable, but offering a broad array of such courses is an unjustifiable
luxury when students lack meaningful access to necessary skills training.
The Wisconsin Law School's bulletin boasts of 12 courses in the areas of
"jurisprudence and legal history" and "law and related disciplines," while
there is but one course devoted to trial advocacy, no course devoted to
pretrial investigation, and no course devoted to engaging in effective
motion practice.37 Absent impetus from outside legal education, this
kind of misallocation of resources is unlikely to be corrected. By failing
to provide such impetus, the Commission's Report may provide legal
educators with a convenient excuse for inaction.
B. Diversity as Justificationfor Maintainingthe Status Quo

The needed reallocation of resources is especially unlikely to occur
if one concludes that training competent lawyers is only one of several
equally important objectives of legal education. Yet, this is precisely
what the Report does. In a remarkable passage, the Report observes:
Teaching law students how to practice law is not the only
purpose law schools serve, however. Law schools must meet
other expectations of the profession, of society, and of the
universities that sponsor them: they are expected to help research
and develop the law and the social policy that shapes it; to
explore and refine new areas of law; to train scholars of the law;
to graduate students in the mental discipline of legal reasoning,
36. Id. at 271-72.
37. UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN 1994-1995.
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which is often put to work by graduates who never practice law;
to comprehend the knowledge explosion in the field of law that
is concomitant with the explosion of knowledge in other technological and professional fields with which law intertwines; to make
that knowledge comprehensible to students, to practicing
professionals, and to society; and to preserve and enhance the
prestige they have earned within the academic, professional, and
civic communities. In all of these ways law schools add tremendous value to society. These expectations are valid, and they
be subordinatedto the other expectations law schools must
cannot
38
meet.

Training "legal scholars" as well as training "graduate students in the
mental discipline of legal reasoning" are certainly worthy objectives. But
there are several reasons why this graduate school within a professional
school approach to legal education is undesirable. First, law schools do
not tell the public which graduates are the lawyers and which graduates
are the scholars and thinkers. They are all lumped together and given
law degrees. Their law degrees are then accepted by bar examiners
around the country as evidence that they have been trained to practice
law. Many of the scholars and thinkers are likely to find that employment as a scholar or thinker is hard to come by. Sooner or later they
instead enter the practice of law. Their law degrees permit them to do,
even though they have not been trained to practice law and are clearly
not competent to represent clients.
Second, one must question whether there really are many students
within the law school training to become scholars or thinkers rather than
lawyers. The vast majority of students who enroll at Wisconsin and
Marquette probably instead hope to become outstanding lawyers. And
nothing happens during law school to change this fact. The two schools
combine to produce approximately 450 graduates each year; yet there
are currently a total of only 137 law school teachers who graduated from
one of Wisconsin's two law schools.39 The overwhelming percentage of
students do not become professional scholars or thinkers. Moreover,
most of the relative handful who do eventually teach also practice law
for at least a brief period before beginning their careers as scholars
They thus need to be trained to practice law. Nonetheless, allocating
substantial resources to training a handful of scholars and graduate
38. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 25-26 (emphasis
added).
39. See ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW. SCH., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS,
1995-96 (1996).
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students might be justified if law schools were adequately training the
great majority of students who intend to become lawyers. But given the
absence of satisfactory skills training for prospective lawyers, such a
misallocation of resources can hardly be justified.
In the final analysis, one is left with the suspicion that "diversity of
purpose" is really only an excuse by legal educators for not getting the
job done in training lawyers. Every competent lawyer is a legal scholar.
Every competent lawyer is skilled in the discipline of legal reasoning.
And every competent lawyer is involved in developing law and social
policy. Thus, every good law school should train all students in legal
scholarship and legal reasoning for the single purpose of preparing
students to be competent lawyers. But a good lawyer is much more than
a scholar and thinker. The fact that a handful of students will stop short
of practicing law is simply no excuse for failing to provide the vast
majority of students who will practice law with the skills training
required to do so competently.
C. Freedom as Justificationfor Maintainingthe Status Quo
Just as the Report embraces diversity of mission and lack of
resources as excuses for legal education, the Report can also be read to
endorse the concept of freedom as an excuse for failure. The concept of
freedom as found in the Report has two manifestations. The first is
freedom of students to chose a course of study, even if that course of
study does not prepare them to practice law. The second is the academic
freedom of faculty members to decide what they will teach, even if what
they decide is contrary to the goal of preparing students to practice law.
Freedom of choice is hard to challenge, unless one focuses on the fact
that choices made by the students and faculty ultimately impact persons
who had no input into the choice: members of the public who may be
devastated in a moment of personal crisis by the provision of incompetent legal services.
1. Freedom of Choice for Students
Teaching students all they need to know as lawyers is obviously
implausible. Some choices must be made. The best option would be to
teach each student what that student is most likely to use in the student's
chosen area of practice. Because career objectives differ from one
student to the next, this option would necessitate allowing each student
considerable flexibility in constructing that student's course of study.
The trend in legal education is toward allowing student's greater
flexibility, and the Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report
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appears to accept the legitimacy of that trend. The Report concludes
that:
[I]t may not be necessary for law students to learn these skills in
law school if they will not need to make immediate use of them
upon graduating and if the students will be in a position to learn
the skills at some point after graduation. Law students should
decide for themselves how they will concentrate their efforts in
law school, but they should expect guidance from the law schools
in structuring their course work to ensure they learn the skills
they will need to practice upon graduation. Further, to the extent
that a law student wishes to become more than simply familiar with
these skills, the student has the right to expect that the school will
offer courses or other alternatives whereby the student may learn
to perform those skills.4"
Allowing students to decide what they will learn based on their
particular career objectives is certainly a superficially appealing answer
to the question "what do we teach." But closer analysis suggests that the
trend toward allowing students greater freedom in developing a course
of study has actually materially interfered with the objective of preparing
students to practice law. While many students believe they know
precisely what direction their career will take, many early predictions
prove incorrect. Students who enter law school with one objective in
mind later change their career plans because of exposure to new and
more appealing areas of practice, or perhaps because of the realities of
the employment market. A student allowed to ignore courses and skills
essential to most types of law practice will be ill-equipped to function as
a competent professional upon graduation. Moreover, even students
who accurately predict their career path at an early stage in law school
are unlikely to have sufficient knowledge and experience to make wise
curricular choices. Though perhaps not apparent to a student who has
never practiced law, familiarity with concepts of corporate and partnership law is essential to a career as a personal injury lawyer. When an
agent of the organization causes injuries, the personal injury lawyer must
know who to sue, where to find assets of the organization, and whether
circumstances might allow piercing of the corporate veil to reach the
owner's personal assets. Similarly, a course on evidence may lack any
apparent relevance to a prospective business lawyer. But evidence is
really a course on reliability and probativeness of information. The

40. Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 33 (emphasis
added).
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business lawyer is continuously required to evaluate information in
advising clients, and thus needs to understand the basic concepts that
undergird the law of evidence. Imprudent curricular choices are a
necessary consequence of inexperienced students being left entirely in
control of planning their legal education.
Many law faculties attempt to address the problem of uninformed
choice by providing extensive curricular recommendations in place of
mandates. But faculty counseling is an inadequate substitute for
requiring students to complete a course of study that the faculty believes
students should take. There will always be students who fall through the
cracks-students who fail to seek faculty advice in course selection, or
students who reject the advice received and make poor choices.
Nonetheless, if only the student were adversely affected by poor
curricular choices, perhaps the virtue of individual freedom and
autonomy would justify allowing the student to make serious mistakes.
But, of course, the student is not the only person affected. Indeed, the
student may not even be the person principally affected. Future clients
are likely to also suffer from the student's unwise curricular decisions.
Requiring students to take courses the faculty believes should be
taken has an additional virtue: it facilitates sequencing upper-level
courses. Lack of sequence in the upperclass curriculum creates
inefficiency. In the typical unstructured law school program, instructors
teaching advanced classes have no assurance that students have
completed any particular courses, aside from those required in the firstyear and those designated as prerequisites for the advanced courses.
This lack of structure impairs the ability of instructors in advanced
courses to build on a pre-existing base of knowledge. An instructor
teaching professional responsibility, for example, will have some students
who have taken a course in business organizations and some who have
not. When that instructor reaches the material on conflicts of interest in
an organizational setting, the audience includes students who lack
familiarity with the basic principles of corporate organization. The
instructor must cover these principles as a prerequisite to discussing the
conflicts issues. For those students who have taken a business organizations course, this review may be a waste of time.
Lack of sequence also limits the level of sophistication in upper-level
courses. The professional responsibility instructor who cannot assume
an existing understanding of corporate organization certainly cannot
discuss issues that require a sophisticated understanding of corporate law
principles, even if the instructor provides an overview of the basics of
corporate law. Neither can instructors teaching courses in estate
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planning, bankruptcy, or a host of other subjects which build on basic
corporate law principles. The lack of upper-level structure thus
interferes with a progression through materials of increasing difficulty in
the second and third years of law school. Rather than building upon one
another, the upper-level courses operate independently and seem
unrelated. This seeming lack of interrelationship prevents students from
fully understanding how law works. As one commentator has observed:
Later learning should reinforce, by drawing and building upon,
earlier learning; that the later should also transcend the earlier so
as to provide the student with a rewarding sense of advancement
along an intelligible path of learning that culminates in advanced
work on problems plainly beyond the powers of beginners; that
there should be an orientation at each stage, so that students
clearly and explicitly understand the purposes motivating the
content and methods of instruction.4'
The lack of progression is at least partially to blame for student apathy
that tends to characterize the third-year of law school, in particular. A
student who believes a particular course leads nowhere but towards
graduation is likely to adopt a minimalist approach to that course.
Requiring students to complete courses also facilitates rigor, and rigor
facilitates learning. We all tend to achieve more when we are challenged
to do more. We are more likely to read for class if reading is insisted
upon. We are more likely to attend class if attendance is insisted upon.
And we are more likely to work hard to succeed if failure is a possibility.
Yet, even though being challenged is good for students (indeed for all of
us), there is a natural human tendency to prefer being comfortable. If
a course is challenging (including the possibility of failure), many
students will naturally avoid the course for this reason alone. An
instructor who teaches an elective risks losing enrollment if students are
made uncomfortable. Consequently, designating courses that all students
should take as electives tends to negatively impact on the effectiveness
of the instruction.
There are, of course, costs to requiring all students to complete
particular courses. Most students would understandably prefer flexibility
and choice. Even a student who intends to take a class in income
taxation would probably prefer having the option of taking something
else instead. Many students who are told what to take are resentful,
especially in this age of indeterminacy in education. These resentful

41. Frank I. Michelman, The Partsand the Whole: Non-Euclidean CurricularGeometry,
32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 352, 355 (1982).
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students view faculty dictates as "antidemocratic." Implicit within this
criticism is an assumption that students know as well as faculty what is
required to succeed in the practice of law. Were this assumption true,
of course, it would be illegitimate for faculty to direct students' course
of study. But where a faculty has been selected from among the ranks
of successful legal practitioners, that faculty does know more than
students about what is required to succeed simply by virtue of its
collective experience. This does not mean that every student should be
required to complete the same course of study. But it does mean that
all students should be exposed to fundamental legal doctrine, should be
required to complete courses designed to develop critical thinking,
speaking, and writing skills, and should be required to experience a
reasonable range of lawyering tasks prior to graduation.
2. Academic Freedom for Faculty
Academic freedom has become a mantra in some circles for allowing
the faculty members to do whatever they chose. The concept was never
intended, however, to allow a faculty member freedom from the
responsibility of teaching the subject assigned.2 Consistent with
academic freedom, an instructor assigned to teach Contracts can be
required to teach basic contracts doctrine. An instructor assigned to
teach Trial Advocacy can be required to teach trial procedure under the
Wisconsin and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And an instructor
assigned responsibility for developing certain lawyering skills or for
exposing students to certain lawyering tasks can be required to accomplish these objectives.
The Report nonetheless cautions that the principle of academic
freedom may create a practical challenge for law schools "in regulating
what is taught in any given classroom by any given faculty member."
This is, of course, nonsense. Like any freedom, academic freedom is not
without limit. A school that recognizes its responsibility to prepare
students for the weighty responsibilities that they in turn will shoulder as
lawyers can insist that faculty members likewise behave responsibly. A
teacher who will not teach basic contract doctrine in Contracts can be
assigned a less important course. If the teacher proves generally
incompetent or insubordinate, he or she should be fired. Incompetence
42. The 1940 Statement of Principles Regarding Academic Freedom developed by the
American Association of University Professors acknowledges that a teacher is entitled to
freedom in "discussing his subject" and that a teacher "should be careful not to introduce into
his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject."
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and insubordination are ordinarily grounds for termination of even
tenured faculty members, provided the university administration and
faculty have the courage to do what is necessary to ensure a quality
education for their students.
Those faculty members who would feel their freedom threatened by
any requirement that they behave responsibly might be wise to ponder
why students enroll in their classes. It may be that students are willing
to pay tuition dollars to hear whatever the faculty member has to say;
more likely the students attend because the public tells the students they
must attend in order to receive a license to practice law. It seems little
to ask in exchange for providing the faculty member with a captive
audience (and thus a paycheck) that the faculty member teach the
students something useful.
Nonetheless, the Report at times appears to plead for cooperation
from faculty members. The Report urges that teaching necessary skills
and values will "require the collective cooperation and dedication of a
predominantportion of the faculty."'43 The Report later "recommends
that law schools foster ways for their faculties to emulate" those faculty
members who do effectively teach lawyering skills.'
Organizations
outside the university are not, of course, in a good position to mandate
directly what is being taught in individual classes. One way to monitor
what is taught indirectly, however, is through external examinations as
a prerequisite for licensing. To the extent the Commission truly
perceives itself and administrators unable to control what is taught in law
schools, perhaps the time has come to abandon the diploma privilege in
Wisconsin.
IV. CONCLUSION

Legal education today is suffering from many of the same problems
that plague higher education generally. Law school programs have
become increasingly irrelevant, the attractiveness of becoming a lawyer
has declined, and the cost of legal education has soared. Lawyers and
law students alike have become increasingly dissatisfied.
Many
prospective law students are looking to other professions. There is a
need for reform. And there is a growing perception that this reform will
have to come from outside the academic community. Just as many state

43.

Wisconsin Commission on Legal Education Report, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis

added).
44. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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legislatures are beginning to insist on accountability generally in higher
education, it may be time for the legal profession to insist on accountability in legal education. The Wisconsin Commission on Legal
Education Report makes a material contribution by insisting that law
school graduates should be able to do what lawyers do. A real question
remains, however, regarding whether legal educators, left to their own
designs, are up to the challenge.

